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SANNE VAN DER HOUT AND PAUL VAN HAPEREN1 
 
This volume comprises 10 essays that draw on the diverse set of meanings of 
genomes. Since genomic science covers a wide range of activities, it is hard to say 
unambiguously what genomics is. In the introductory chapter, Sarah Parry and John 
Dupré argue that a lot of confusion is created by the fact that there are two different 
ways to think about the genome: either in an abstract way, namely as a body of 
information, or as a material thing. A second reason why genomics is surrounded by 
confusion is that this concept is not always construed narrowly, but is sometimes used 
to refer to a broad range of contemporary biomolecular investigations.  
 
As indicated by the title, this book is not only about genomics. Parry and Dupré are 
interested in the ways in which the issue of nature is significant in relation to 
genomics. They argue that, since genomics places biology, and consequently nature, 
centre stage, “genomics provides new knowledge and understandings of the natural 
and social worlds” (p.6). Besides studying the biological world, however, genomics 
“also involves producing that world both symbolically and materially” (p.6). 
Consequently, genomics also changes the relationship between the natural and social 
worlds. The phrase ‘after the genome’ might create the impression that Parry and 
Dupré understand genomics as a finished event. The editors claim however, that 
genomics “is at its beginning rather than a thing of the past” (p.4), so with that phrase, 
they refer to the ways in which (our understanding of) nature is reshaped by 
developments in genomics science.  
 
After the introduction the book is divided into five parts, each reflecting a different 
theme. Each theme is tackled in two essays by different authors with backgrounds in 
the social sciences or the humanities. In the first, the pair of authors critically assesses 
the ways in which biological entities are classified. In ‘The polygenomic organism’, 
John Dupré challenges the assumption that genomes stand in one-to-one relations with 
organisms. With the aid of different examples – clones, chimerism, mosaicism, 
epigenetics/epigenomics – he aims to show that the boundaries of biological 
individuals cannot be demarcated by reference to their genotypes. With his final 
example, symbiosis and metaorganisms, Dupré makes a more radical suggestion: 
“[T]here are good reasons to deny the almost universal assumption that all the cells in 
an individual must belong to the same species” (p.27). He illustrates this by pointing 
to the fact that about 90 per cent of the cells in our body belong to microbial 
symbionts. These symbionts are essential for its proper functioning. By proving the 
invalidity of the assumption of one genome, one organism, and by showing that 
“biological entities consist of disparate elements working together” (p.29), Dupré 
invites us to rethink the (natural) boundaries of biological objects. What’s more, he 
encourages us to consider how this questioning of our traditional ordering systems 
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affects the ethical, social, and legal distinctions of the ‘individual’. Nicola Marks 
further reflects on our dominant classification systems. She discusses the 
epistemological, ontological and socio-political implications of classifying stem cells 
– and by extension nature – according to particular criteria. Marks argues that the 
classification of stem cells into specific groups (e.g. ‘adult’, ‘foetal’ and ‘embryonic’) 
reflects not only the material characteristics of the entities in question, but also the 
goals and interests of those doing the classifying. Hence, classifications must be 
understood “as socially sustained ‘institutions’ underpinned by knowledge that is 
itself inherently social” (p.33).   
 
The next two chapters explore how genomics is reconfiguring the gene/environment, 
or nature/nurture relationship. Gail Davies critically assesses the extent to which 
animal experiments in behavioural neuroscience could help us to understand human 
behaviour. Following Evelyn Fox Keller, Davies argues that “ideas about nature as 
separate from nurture endure in the models, metaphors, drugs and devices used in 
experimental practices and scientific claims, particularly in the study of behavioural 
genetics” (p.56). In contemporary experiments, this nature/nurture distinction is 
generally rearticulated as a duality between genes and environment. Davies explains 
that this reductionist approach undermines the importance of social, historical, 
environmental or other experiential elements to an animal’s behaviour. Reflecting on 
the philosophical thought of Giorgio Agamben, she aims to replace reductionist 
explanations of species’ behaviour with more relational “accounts and experimental 
practices that recognize and allocate agency in creatively open ways” (p.67). Karen 
Throsby and Celia Roberts also discuss the limitations of the gene-environment 
distinction, but by focusing on two rather different case studies: precocious puberty 
and childhood obesity. In biomedical discourses, both conditions are explained 
according to genetic predisposition in interaction with environments. Throsby and 
Roberts are especially interested in the aetiological and moral complexities that are 
left out in such reductionist explanations: “What new questions can be asked, and new 
kinds of interventions [...] imagined, if the gene-environment distinction is refused?” 
(p.74). In line with Davies, Throsby and Roberts argue that to make effective 
interventions in the cases of early puberty and childhood obesity, we must think about 
bodies in relational terms. Inspired by Anne Fausto-Sterling, they claim that we must 
refuse a separation between genes and environments, and instead think of ourselves as 
“always 100 percent nature and 100 percent nurture” (p.88).   
 
The third pair of authors focuses on the creation of new kinds of objects in genomics-
related research. Jane Calvert examines the ways in which synthetic biology is 
(re)constructing nature. Synthetic biology is a new field of science capable of 
producing completely novel biological entities. By blurring the boundaries between 
the natural and the artificial, the field challenges our notions of what is ‘natural’. 
Calvert explains that pressures for engineerability, commodification and 
standardisation are all pulling towards a reconstruction of nature which is 
instrumentalisable and utilisable for our purposes. She expects these pressures to have 
profound consequences for the kinds of living things that will be brought into the 
world in the future. Calvert nevertheless concludes that our desire to control nature 
may be hampered by nature’s apparent unruliness. She argues that “it will be 
fascinating to see [...] what limitations the exuberance of nature will impose on the 
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scientists and engineers’ desire for control” (p.109). Sarah Parry examines “how ideas 
of animal and human nature are figured in the case of interspecies entities” (p.125). 
She wants to explore “the material and discursive implications of these inscriptions” 
(p.125). Like the entities created by synthetic biologists, interspecies – e.g. animal-
human embryos – can only come into being through technoscientific intervention in 
laboratory practices. Drawing on transcripts of the debate at a specific public event, 
Parry analyses how classification of interspecies leads to the prioritisation of certain 
features at the expense of other characteristics.  
 
The next two chapters examine how genomics transforms plant life. Richard Milne 
explores the future of biopharming, the production of pharmaceuticals using 
genetically modified crops. Conventional food crops are considered ideal for 
biopharming. Using edible crops for pharmaceutical purposes, however, raises 
questions about the material and symbolic boundaries of food. Drawing on data 
derived from expert and public discussions, Milne shows how “the same materiality 
[i.e. maize] can come to embody both hopes and fears around new technologies as the 
complexities around it multiply” (p.148). Claire Waterton critically examines ‘DNA 
barcoding’, a recent innovation within the discipline of taxonomy. In pro-barcoding 
literature, this genomic technology is generally presented as “the key that [will] 
unlock the secrets of the diversity of life” (p.157). Waterton argues that the vision of 
barcoding as a new global taxonomic system should be questioned. Drawing on 
interviews with practising taxonomists, she shows how debates about nature and 
culture, and the natural and the social, seriously affect the ways in which we order and 
classify the natural world.  
 
Compared to the previous chapters, the final two chapters have quite a broad focus, 
discussing how developments in genomics increasingly affect theories of nature. 
Richard Twine analyses how ‘nature’ is conceptualised in genomics by examining the 
distinction between transhumanism and critical posthumanism. Whereas 
transhumanism and critical posthumanism have some aspects in common, the former 
generally sticks to the Enlightenment’s dualistic understandings of ‘nature’. 
Posthumanism, on the other hand, tries to unravel dualistic ontology; it criticises 
transhumanism for its failure “to engage critically with the constellation of dualistic 
ontology which has fuelled humanism’s capacity for exclusion and othering” (p.183). 
With the aid of two examples – the use of hybrid embryos in stem cell research and 
the use of interspecies databases in farm animal comparative genomics – Twine 
shows that genomics frames nature in ways that are faithful to transhumanist values. 
At the same time, however, genomics undermines Enlightenment conceptions of 
nature, for instance by showing the ways in which laboratory animals are ‘humanised’ 
for comparative studies, and how we use animal models to find cures for human 
diseases. As such, genomics also encourages us to think beyond dualistic categories of 
human/animal and nature/culture. In ‘Life Times’, Tim Newton argues that many 
contemporaries consider dualism to be responsible for many of the ills of knowledge 
construction since the Enlightenment. The desire to break down dualistic barriers, 
however, involves the danger of denying the possibility of differences in our 
perception of temporality across physical, biological and social spheres. Newton finds 
the assumption that ‘social’ and ‘biological’ time are ‘one’ in a diversity of 
contemporary fields, for example in the images of temporality engendered by a central 
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concept of molecular anthropology: the ‘molecular clock’. Newton concludes by 
arguing that “even though human beings constitute a social and biochemical ‘unity of 
substance’ [...], this does not mean that we perceive temporality across the domains of 
nature in exactly the same way” (p.211). 
 
Because of its interdisciplinary focus, Nature after the Genome provides intriguing 
information for quite a broad audience. By bringing together empirical material and 
philosophical reflections, this volume is not only interesting for readers from the 
social sciences and the humanities, but also for scientists working in the field of 
genomics. By showing how genomic science “is situated as a social activity in a much 
wider social and political context” (p.9), the book encourages genomic scientists to 
reflect on the ways in which nature is reshaped by developments in this field. As each 
chapter can also be read as a standalone essay, the book contains relevant information 
for readers with more specific interests as well (e.g. synthetic biology, biopharming).  
  
Notwithstanding that Nature after the Genome brings together a wide range of 
perspectives and conceptual views, Parry and Dupré do succeed in merging these 
various contributions into a unity. Overall, of course, all contributions reflect on the 
same central theme, namely the ways in which developments in genomics question 
our dominant systems of ordering and classifying nature/biological life. What is more, 
the essays to a large extent reflect on the same literature. The writings of Evelyn Fox 
Keller, in particular, appear time and again as an important source of inspiration. The 
book concludes with two essays with a rather broad focus. Although it seems 
reasonable to close with a more general reflection, arguably, the book could equally 
have started with the contributions by Twine and Newton; their considerations would 
have been helpful in reflecting on the issues raised in the other chapters.  
 
In reflecting on the ways in which nature is reshaped by developments in genomic 
science, the contributors to this book mainly focus on ontological and epistemological 
questions. Much less attention is given to the moral implications of these 
developments. The essays in this volume show that genomics practices continually 
undermine traditional classification systems. By reshaping the epistemology and 
ontology of nature, genomics opens up pathways to a new morality. There is ample 
material in this volume to justify a more in-depth discussion of this. Questions 
concerning the (natural) boundaries of biological objects, individual responsibility, 
and the refitting of scientific uncertainties into familiar reductionist schemes, are 
raised but could have been discussed a little bit further. Little attention is paid to the 
political and economic powers that favour certain representations and promissory 
narratives over others. Genomics provides us with the tools and knowledge to distrust 
Enlightenment conceptions of nature. The editors could have offered a new 
perspective of what nature could look like after genomics. Although this volume 
encourages us to reflect on these matters, the book could have given us firmer 
directions for this reflection. 
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